Taac P4Q NQ - practical/premise discussions

Derived directly from the suggestion put forth by @Rob, here is the topic to discuss other than technical issues/concerns with the suggestion.

Several participants in that thread had concerns about the suggestion.

Keep it civil.

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Bitcoin is now worth 60k. Forget about the price, it's the growth. Everyone wants it.

Who would have thought of this growth? Maybe some of you, who been in it for a long while.

Now this Taac P4Q NQ is a noble approach. But for Taac P4Q NQ to work, protocol design will have to design the growth as well. You call it PQ, I call it tomato.

You all are discussing a protocol design around growth and censoring the questions how it is possible to quantify the growth to build a protocol around it? Or, was it already decided?

If you disagree, tell me, what my minimum_gap for 0.75 nano will be in 5 years from now, and we will go from there.

I have laid out most of my concerns reasonably well in the others threads and most are still visible besides a few that @Rob has deleted.

My main argument is that using a arbitrary system of allocating CPS based on some property of a account in principle attaches 'importantance' of a transaction to the account sending it. The end user has limited influence of deciding if the transaction they are sending is worth it if their account does not have this magical property.

In essence top down allocation of a limited resource is incredibly innefiecient.
People that don't it need will have an allocation while people that do won't have it.

Now in those threads there is a great deal of speculation based on the unknown properties of the Nano network as it stands and how it may develop in the future.
What is the current saturation limit? Looks like it could be anywhere between 60-150. How many of the current transactions are 'real'? How much did the attacker really have to spend to execute it? etc.
Too many unknowns and anybody can make up numbers to suit their argument.

So how about we use a network that we do know a great deal about.

The Bitcoin network.

P4Q on the Bitcoin network

Lets apply the protocol change and see it how it works out.

I will ignore the bottom 50% of accounts. Those that have less than $50. You can safely assume that those are no longer active. (they only have 0.02% of total bitcoin distribution in any case).

Taking the above into account then the bitcoin distribution is such that the top 4% have 95% of the stake.

Unfortunaly Nano crawler is still down and don't know where else i could find it but i think it would be safe to assume that nano distribtuion would be similar.

So with P4Q on Bitcoin 4% of the users would control 95% of CPS - AND they would get it them for free.

Now those rich addresses didn't get all that Bitcoin by being stupid. They will realize that they have a commodity that is in high demand.

What do you think will happen to fee prices?
Will they go up or down now that you have given 95% of it away for free to people that understand the dynamics of supply and demand? Sounds a great deal like monopoly control open to rampant manipulation.

One of the premises P4Q assumes is that PoW is unusable by presenting the following:

1. Mobile users
Mobile users don't do PoW and it was perhaps only the first Nano foundation mobile wallet that supported the option. While that may have been a goal early on I don't think anyone really believes that is feasible.

2. ASIC attacker
The attacker that has funded and produced an ASIC that nobody else has access to. The probability of that is likely zero. If the attacker has access to it then the distributed PoW services practically everyone uses now will also have access to it.

And if that is percieved as being a real threat then there is a really easy solution to that. We switch to Bitcoin PoW algorithm. I'm sure there are plenty of cheap second hand ASIC's laying about that are not many magictudes less efficient than the current econimically viable ones.


This protocol change should not be presented as something that PoW can't solve but should rather be evaluated on it's own merits.

ok. whatever that means. sure

What questions have been censored? Putting questions into different threads isn't censorship. If you were censored, your question wouldn't be here.

I'm not sure that I understand the question.

Sorry, did you have some kind of premise with which somebody could disagree? There was just so much aimless blustering and grandstanding that I failed to deduce any type of.. actual point. What might someone disagree with?

You might as well be asking me what I'm going to eat for breakfast in 5 years from now. I might not even be alive in 5 years from now. How am I supposed to answer you without knowledge about things that I don't know about the future?

  • How much could be destaked
  • How much TPS the network can handle

Assuming we could destake around 90% of the network, your minimum gap would be roughly 1 over (0.75 out of ~13.3m) divided by the global TPS. If Nano can only handle 100 TPS, this would be ~177,333, or roughly once per 2 days. If Nano can handle 10,000 TPS, this would be ~1,773, or roughly once per 30 minutes. If Nano can handle 1m TPS, this would be ~17.73, or roughly three transactions per minute.

In the absolute worst case scenario (network TPS is reduced to 100 TPS and we cannot destake any, not even burnt Nano), you'd get around one transaction per 20 days. In the absolute best case (we can destake 99.99% and the network is capable of handling 1mil TPS and there's some other 10x modifier due to some new innovative idea), you'd get around 6 TPS.

So there you have it. Somewhere between 6 TPS and one transaction per 20 days.

They have full power: they can buy more. You keep pushing for more paid PoW solutions since "then supply-demand economics encourage users to pay more money"... great, users can already pay more money, for Nano.

This is stated but not really elaborated or expanded upon. And fails to acknowledge the fact that unused throughput gets recycled rather than destroyed, which means there's no space of inefficiencies unless you're claiming that the system inherently encourages wasted TPS.

But almost none of these numbers really matter to the proposal. You might as well be saying "How many dogs are in Africa?!?! It's anybody's guess!" It just doesn't matter. Why would I care how much money an attacker is spending in some current spam attack? You realize that this proposal predates the current spam attack by around 3 years, right?

This is the equivalent of ignoring all Nano users with sub-10ish Nano or so FYI:

You could've just looked into the other thread, where I posted that same pyramid.

So your argument is that the rich actors might split apart their wallets and sell their unused high-priority TPS to poor people? Because:

  1. dPoW (which you advocate for!) also promotes a fee structure
  2. Custodial wallets will exist in crypto regardless of this and that's okay since most people do not understand crypto well enough to be the custodians of their own wallets even if they wish to use the currency (read: my grandparents) and would allow for this regardless of incentives
  3. This would require an absolutely absurdly high investment into the currency as a whole, and being particularly abusive to the point where it damages the network would hurt your major investment by more than you are gaining from the nickel and dimes you're pulling from tx fees for a small amount of people
  4. The rich can only get their fair share of TPS anyway. If you own 5% of network and capitalize it by selling that TPS to other people, the other 95% of the network's TPS is untouchable by you, so nobody else is hurt a nyway.

Lines like this make it just how painfully clear that you don't even understand the proposal, which is why it's great that you're cluttering up your own thread now instead of the main one. Thanks.

You ignore the scenario where this is an investment that costs, say, 10 million dollars. There exists a sweet spot there where that is WAAAAY too much money for a PoW shop to invest in and hope to recoup by nickel and diming some customers for tiny surcharges on their tx, but absolutely recoupable by an attacker that short-sells the currency before nuking it from orbit.

It is. It was threat modeled against an attacker with infinite PoW so that it could also handle that threat. That does not guarantee that an attacker has infinite PoW. But I'd rather buy a house that was threat modeled against a hurricane over one that was just threat modeled against "moderate winds."

The main issue I see with the design is the normal queue. This is intended to function exactly the same as the current network, and process all transactions that fail to meet the priority queue's requirements. However, I believe that this design will eventually lead to the NQ being spammed to the level of the current network, leaving the poor users to suffer the enormous delays that come with having their transactions processed in the priority queue.

Rob has stated that there is no incentive to attack the normal queue, because if it is spammed, the priority queue will still protect the value of the network. I am not so sure this is the case. In this proposal, the normal queue is still a source of significant usefulness. A spam of the normal queue would make it difficult for Nano to retain the ideals of allowing everyone to participate in the network, including those without much funds in third-world countries. I believe that in this scenario, the perceived value of Nano is reduced, leading to it likely being profitable for a person to execute this type of spam.

How about you try and take this seriously and respond honestly.

They have no power. If they wanted more Nano and could afford it they would already have it.
How would someone get 2 x their TPS allotment if they didn't have some spare capital lying around?
With a PoW service you could pay the service the cost of an actual transaction to the service for as many transactions as you need.

How is unused throughout recycled? I haven't seen much of that.

I have seen destaking as the mechanism for that:

  • forced destaking above certain stake. This will only lead to splitting of accounts in smaller stake values so that they fall under whichever threshhold is set.
  • voluntary destaking: connecting stakeholder A with user B is unwieldy, ineffiecient and will only work if stakeholder A has enough econmic gain to go through the effort.

Anything else that i have missed?

Of coarse it matters. If you are going to make a proposol that needs to work in the real world you should be able to apply it to the real world.

If you were honest about wanting to do that you would have realised that i agree that speculating on Nano's numbers is not productive.
My suggestion is apply the proposal to a network that is well known.

How dishonest can you possibly be? Nano does not have a market cap of 1 Trillion.
This is equivilant to igoring nano holders with less than $0.0375.

Yes. It can only make it more expensive for poor people. That was what i hoped you would learn from the example of applying it to the Bitcoin network:

  • If they don't sell their unused TPS it make it more expensive
  • If they do sell they also make it more expensive.

There is no that way giving large stakeholders more TPS than they need does not make it more expensive for poorer stakeholders.

No it makes it clear that you don't want to acknowledge how this plays out in the real world. You add a massive amount of friction to gaining the TPS you need if you do need it.

With a PoW service, you pay a service for more TPS. But you just said they have no spare capital lying around. So which is it? Do they have spare capital, or not?

You're advocating renting. I'm advocating homeownership.

Three ways.


You are assuming that every single actor in the network is malicious, which they aren't. There are a multitude reasons why forced destaking will be successful:

A. Tons of money sits in cold wallets of benevolent actors who will gladly donate the TPS to the rest of the network simply out of altruism.
B. Tons of money sits in burnt wallets that will never be recovered. I know of a man who has around 150k Nano in a wallet that he lost the seed to. He will not touch that Nano even if he wants to.
C. Tons of money sits in wallets where nobody has jurisdiction to touch it. The BitGrail wallet has around 5m Nano that is held by the Italian government and is generating 0 TPS.
D. Tons of money sits in cold wallets held by Binance, which would be costly, unwieldy, and potentially insecure for them to split (due to their implementation creating new vectors against their business).
E. Tons of investors will want to "donate" that TPS to the rest of the network not out of altruism, but because providing a healthy/more robust network improves their investment, and they are, by definition, millions of dollars invested into Nano.


I agree. It was not my idea -- I was a huge fan, and saw it as best as a "could help, couldn't hurt" proposal.


Yes. Unused TPS is given to the NQ.

Let's give hypothetical numbers about how much you would need to work and pay to try to screw over the network when you're a benevolent actor and what it could mean to you:

Let's say you own 10% of the Nano as a benevolent actor, and are allocated 0.1% of the TPS. You only really use 0.01% of it, almost always, and the other 0.09% goes unused most days.

So here's the breakdown of your contributions to the network:

9.9%: You own it, but it's voluntarily donated to the rest of the PQ.
0.09%: You own it for the PQ, but you aren't using it, so it's voluntarily donated to the NQ.
0.01%: You own it and you use it.

If you wake up one morning and decide, for some reason, "I have 50 million dollars invested into Nano, and it's operating well. Screw that. I want to ruin my own investment to make pennies on the dollar! I will start by taking back all of my TPS!" this is what you would need to do:

First, you would need to split your account into 100 smaller accounts. This would ensure that you stop voluntarily donating your TPS to the rest of the PQ, as each account would be worth 0.1% of the total currency (and, thus, at the 0.1% threshold cutoff). This would bring your breakdown up to:

9.99%: You own it for the PQ, but you aren't using it, so it's voluntarily donated to the NQ.
0.01%: You own it and you use it.

Second, you would need to generate one hundred times as much traffic for no reason other than to consume your allocated TPS. So you'd effectively need to start spamming so as to degrade service a bit (which would hurt your own investment).

Third, you advertise it as a custodial wallet and charge people fees. People give you their Nano and you send it on their behalf for a small withdrawal fee.

You know... Since you are sitting on millions of Nano, might as well start letting people buy it and sell it from you directly for USD. And if people want to pay with BTC or some other coins, that's not a bad idea either. Maybe you just make your website some kind of front-end where people can just transform their Nano into USD or other currencies and coins?

It seems like a sound business model... you would get a small amount of profit on every transaction, due to people needing to pay you fees. People would need to pay a small fee to send their Nano from your custodial wallet to another address.. we can just call it a "withdrawal" fee, because that's what they're kinda doing, right?

So hmm... custodial wallet, people exchanging the Nano for other currencies, a fee to withdraw from the wallet... Good job, you just invented exchanges!

At the risk of sounding too much of a skeptic, I don't think that every single Nano user with more than 0.01% of the network is going to go out and make an exchange, but don't let that convince you.

This is irrelevant to what I said. Did you get confused when replying? What I said was:

And it was in response to:

This has absolutely nothing to do with "My suggestion is apply the proposal to a network that is well known."

The current saturation limit, # of real transactions, and price to the attacker are all irrelevant for the proposal. You trying to say "but let's apply it to Bitcoin!" is irrelevant altogether.

Dishonest? You said that you were ignoring all BTC holders who only accounted for 0.02% of the currency. This is the equivalent of ignoring all Nano holders who have about 10 or less Nano.

You are trying to apply percentages and real numbers all wrong, man. You want to ignore people with less than $50 in BTC because "they only account for 0.02% of BTC" while including people in Nano who own less than 0.0001% of the currency. YOU'RE the one being dishonest.

If they don't sell their unused TPS, it goes straight to the NQ. By definition, it does not make it more expensive.

If they DO sell their unused TPS, they're creating a fee system via custodial wallets (which exchanges already do...), which is exactly what you're advertising for in dPoW anyway.

Yes it really seems as though you missed the "unused TPS goes to NQ" portion of the proposal altogether, which is probably why multiple people have been saying you don't seem to understand the proposal.

Says the guy who, and I'll reiterate, did not know that unused TPS goes to NQ despite it being written about a dozen times in the main thread. Tell us again how you obviously really understood the proposal.

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Ideals are nice, but they don't pay the bills. The global economy is booming, S&P reaching all-time highs, with ongoing genocide in China.

At the end of the day, people vote with their wallets. DoS'ing out 0.02% of the currency (by wealth) is not going to affect the price of Nano. This means that the attacker will not profit from the attack. I'm not going to try to defend against an attacker who you think will invest tens of millions of dollars in order to attack the system for no profits. It'd cost less to have the dev team assassinated, which would actually yield profits.

And, to be clear, the current network allows 100.0% of wealth to be spammed out during a devastating spam attack, and this proposal only directly protects 99.98% of that wealth, so it's no good and we should go back to the drawing board?

What threshold is enough for you? It isn't possible for us to defend against an irrational attacker whose goal is "waste millions of dollars to destroy Nano by any means necessary." In the worst case scenario, they could just go out and buy up 51% of the currency and start issuing double-spends to destroy the coin.

Crypto is inherently built on game theory and the belief that humans will act in a way that is profitable to themselves. Security via PoW and PoS are both examples of this. If there's a billionaire attacker whose goal is to destroy everything they've made, I'd be more afraid of a nuclear holocaust than them making a big stand on a crypto.


Dishonest again... they have capital that they are trying to use. Unfortunataly the only way to use is to find more capital. They don't want their capital stuck in a house (stake) they want to use it.

Dishonest. They aren't malicious. Gradually they will realise that their unused stake has value and will try and profit from that. There is nothing malicious about that.

I'm sure intialially there will be unused stake but the gradual move will be towards using it for profit.

A, D, E - many assumptions which i believe are incorrect. Initially it will not be donated willfully, but by default. If any one of those actors would find a way to make a profit from their stake many will follow.
If this proposal is as inneficient at allocting TPS as i expect then there will be many people looking for a way to get a hold of it. The house (stake) renters will be quick to offer them some of theirs.

I read in your other thread you were thinking of leaving just a 10% TPS allocation to the NQ. Not much room there. Probably not a good idea that will develope any further.

If you were one of those benevolent actors and you wanted to fund TPS to say a faucet you would need to get around to splitting anyways.

Yes dishonest. You even made a pretty triangle that shows you are being dishonest.
I'm was ignoring accounts with less that $50 because that is the equivalent of 'dust'. They are accounts where fees are costing you so much that it doesn't make sense sending from them.
I was doing my best to help your argument by removing 'participants' from the network. If you want to include them as participants then sure go ahead. Then instead of 4% of the accounts owning 95% of the TPS it would be 2% owning 95% of the TPS. Whichever number you like better is fine with me.

Yes, but most likely it would be the custodians doing that which is where most of the stake is currently. They are for profit organizations by default. Any capital lying around will be used as productively as possible.
I don't believe rich individuals would inclined to do that unless it was really really profitable. From your traingle there are only 950 such accounts. I don't expect too many of them being private individuals.

This has happened a great deal to Bitcoin right? The Bitcoin miners don't find nickel and dimining worthwhile at all /s

This is so funny. I know there is a NQ. How useful is that at the moment?

You change your operating paramters every minute.

When it suits you the premise is that the network is under attack by an alien with a super ASIC and the network is fully saturated.

When it doesn't suit you then we get that there is always the NQ.

If the NQ works what is the point of this proposal? And don't come at me with 'herd immunity'. You only get that when the herd can use the PQ.

Yes, you must have overlooked.

Thesis: A strict linear distribution of TX capacity based on wallet balances may be better than skewing it in favor of smaller wallets.

Observation: Our fundamental goal appears to be finding the most fair way to allocate a scarce resource (Nano transactions) in the event of a bottleneck.

What makes this challenging for Nano is that it disavows two of the most common means for allocating scarce resources: 1. Setting a price and 2. Having a centralized authority decide the allocation.

So most discussion of late has focused around variations of two ideas:

  1. Users given TX capacity with PoW serving as a surrogate for humans.

  2. Users given TX capacity with wallet balances serving as the surrogate.

Criticism of TaaC/P4Q has focused on the imperfection of wallet balances serving as the surrogate. But their own search for modifications to existing PoW schemes makes it clear they agree that PoW is a poor surrogate as well.

Raw PoW is a poor surrogate so long as (1) there is financial incentive to attack/disrupt Nano and (2) a means to pay for PoW. It may be that no matter what scheme is proposed, in a PoW-only environment an attacker will always have the means and incentive to fence other users out.

The TaaC/P4Q proposal wisely retains PoW as it at least requires a non-trivial effort to disrupt the NQ. If a strictly linear distribution of TX capacity to wallet balances were followed spam attacks would be worthless; the only way to fill half the TX capacity with spam would be to own 50% of all Nano.

The problem is that this reduces TX capacity for normal users to unacceptably low levels, at least if significant adoption occurs relative to TX capacity.The idea of donating unused TX capacity from large accounts certainly helps. The more I think about it, the more I see this as the key to optimizing TaaC/P4Q even more than finding some kind of "equitable" skew to the TX allocation to small accounts vs. large ones.

If we skew too much to favor small accounts we are vulnerable to a spammer creating a massive amount of new accounts so they can retain most of the TX capacity. But if we retain a strictly linear distribution AND large accounts wind up donating the vast majority of their TX, I think the pace of TX allocations to small accounts may wind up being tolerable.

With a strict linear allocation the spammer has no way to game the system to garner an unfair share of TX. If he wants a majority of the TX he's going to need to own the majority of Nano, period. With a strictly linear distribution a spammer is helped by donated TX allocations, but it's still proportional to their Nano holdings.

For example, say a spammer with 1% of all Nano attacks; another 9% of Nano is held by active small users and the remaining 90% by larger accounts that need very few TX. In this case the 90% donated down to the remaining 10% only gets the spammer 10% of the network, not enough to seriously impact things.

Would large accounts be inclined to waste their TX allocation rather than let the protocol donate it? Wasting it to maliciously prevent normal users from using Nano would obviously impact the price of Nano, harming their own investment in it. By default large investors will want to help fellow Nano users, not harm them. An exchange that did this would get a bad reputation and lose business. And one or a few malicious large accounts would have little impact; you'd need the majority of Nano's total balance to be wrapped up in such malicious accounts to seriously reduce the amount of donated TX, which is not plausible.

TL/DR: A strict linear distribution of TX capacity based on wallet balances, combined with the protocol automatically donating unused TX capacity to those who need it, may be a better solution than skewing the TX allocation to small accounts and enabling a mass-wallet spam attack. (Note that some restrictions on dust wallets or other secondary rules might be needed for very small accounts.)

I could probably tell if you were a junkie. But, you are not. Just like you can't say how much tps I will have in the future.

Nano uses ORV, and here you are trying to build a whole system around staking.

This is the premise of the P4Q proposal which is false.

Dynamic PoW would work if it would also increase the PoW required from the attacker which it currently does not. It is currently implemented in such a way the attacker does not need to increase PoW to push the network past saturation and keep it there.

Yes, PoW would eventually come at real cost (fee) from distributed PoW services. This would be inevitable if security is provided through PoW. I believe this is the route to go since this leaves all the decision making at the end user. All providers of PoW would be competing to provide the end user with the PoW they need at the lowest cost.

If you believe that an attacker could fence people out then would need to believe that an attacker can fence people out of Bitcoin.

Bitcoin has fees to allocate TX capacity, which as I pointed out is a common solution unavailable to Nano as most of us presumably envision it.

PoW is a poor surrogate for actual humans since a single person can rent out mass quantities of PoW. And saying people will have to pay for it and you're fine with that, how is that consistent with Nano's promise of a virtually feeless system? You might as well migrate to another crypto that already has fees. You're just replacing a straightforward fee system like bitcoin with a complicated one.

TaaC/P4Q with a linear distribution and TX capacity donations provides the clearest means I can see to letting people have a fair allocation of TX without having to start paying fees. If you want to turn Nano into a fee-based crypto go for it, but I will be surprised if you get much traction.

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At the same time under a central authority, a.k.a. people with significant stake.

At the same time under a central authority, a.k.a. people with significant stake.

I've already explicitly said elsewhere that I'm opposed to any means of selling excess capacity as that could create perverse incentives. As I stated here unused TX capacity would simply be donated. That is in no way centralization. But if you want to play that game, relying solely on PoW centralizes things under anyone who controls large amounts of PoW. As the spammer recently demonstrated.

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Ah, that makes sense. My original objection was based on a misunderstanding of the proposal, namely that the PQ limits (1 tx every few hours for users with just a few Nano) applied even when the network was currently not under a spam attack in the priority queue.

To be clear, I never suggested that although the idea has flaws, it should not be implemented - as you stated, it is better than nothing, and I am and have been in full agreement with that.