Due to the nature of the ORV consensus mechanism, holders aren't incentivized to vote. It functions similar to democracy, you vote for someone to represent you. You are neither stimulated to vote nor penalized for non-voting.
Some countries (e.g. Belgium) have penalizing mechanisms for non-voters a.k.a. compulsory voting. Since Nano is a financial netowork and network participants are damaged by their less conscientious co-participants that decide not to vote, I suggest such a mechanism be taken into consideration to enter the ORV consensus mechanism.
It is impossible to give a fine to someone in the Nano network since the private key of the participant is needed to deduct funds and the participant won't give a fine to himself, but a blacklist solution could be implemented to isolate those participants from the network. This would essentialy mean that Nano supply would get significantly smaller over time, the lost-key accounts stake would be removed from the network.
This would strengthen the network because the representatives that would be elected would most likely be active and high-performance and there wouldn't arrise a situation like with NanoVault where 4% of Nano were voting for v21.1 during the spamm attack.
I'm opening this for discussion, looking forward to your responses!